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OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., t.10NTANA)
BEFORE
PACEM IN TERRIS IV
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975
'i'HE SHERI\.TOl'T-PARK HOTEL

HASRI"'GTON, D. C.
2 : 00 p . M.

Foreign Policy '"'ill be an issue in the 1976 campaign .

Barring the

unexpected, however , it will be only an issue, not the issue .

The emphasis

in the coming campaign will be on affairs within the nation .

In particular,

it will be on the state of the nation ' s economy .

Notwithstanding the effort

to talk away our economic difficulties , there has yet to be a recovery from
the worst recession in forty years .

At best, we have managed only to hold on

by fingertips; only a marginal momentum has been generated for recovery .

The

failure to face up to the nation ' s economic problems is to be seen in the
continued high unemployment and inflation .

Deeper consequences are visible in

a general public disquiet and disaffection with government .

Still deeper , in

the bedrock of the nation , are the dangerous fissures of social division .
That is hardly a basis on which to build a national contribution to
Pacem in Terris .

so, I reiterate , the prime issue in the coming election will

be a meandering economy .

Unless we put a stop to the present drift and begin,

also, to look with some coordinated foresight to the looming economic problems
which are only a few years away , the international role of this nation for the
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next decade will be, at most, an indifferent one .

Indeed, it could even become

negative, insofar as contributing to international peace and stability is
concerned.
As for foreign affairs, what is likely to be of major consideration
OJ
in the next election will be the drain of outdated policies as ~ggtp~iRg
factor in the decline of the econonzy-.

Unlike earlier years when money was

spent for activities abroad as though the nation had it to burn, every dollar
that now goes into anacronistic policies and the military structure to support
them is coming, not out of an affluent economy; it is coming out of the hides
of the people .

It is coming from those millions of Americans wi. thout tax

havens and with no ways to hedge the inflation .

Dated foreign policies are

a double burden on an already overburdened segment of the populace .
Expenditures in the name of foreign policy or defense, even valid
expenditures , require taxes and contribute to the pressure for ini'lation .

If

such expenditures are in excess of contemporary needs, they strain the economy
unnecessarily and, in the end, do harm to the structure of the nation.
Take for example, the policy of stationing troops in all parts of
the globe .

Whatever relevance such policies may have had in the immediate

post-world war II period, it does not follow that they are still relevant three
decades later .

~or

does it mean that the nation's defense will collapse if we

alter these deployments , scale them down or even in some cases cut them out
entirely .

OVer half -a -million soldiers were returned from Viet Nam without

endangering the national security.

There are other areas where similar adjust -

ments, far less drastic to be sure, seem to me to be entirely possible and very
desirable .
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we have to change vi th 1t .

But the wheels of

government, regrettably , tend to remain in ruts, especially in regard to
national security affairs .
be learned .

The lesson of Viet Nam, for example, has yet to

Even now an effort is being made to maintain a military position

on the southeast Asian mainland .

The Executive Branch beseeches the Thai

government to permit us to keep at least a shadow of our former presence in
that nation .

What for?

A toehold in Thailand will cost the nation millions

of dollars --that much is clear .

But into what grand design for national

security and peace do we fit a few thousand American servicemen and a scattering
of moth-balled military bases in Thailand?

Similarly, there is great reluctance

in the government to recognize that over a period of time , there has to be a
reduction of

u. s.

forces in Korea and in Japan .

The emphasis of policy in Asia, in short, is as it has been for the
past quarter of a century or more .
as a "military defender . "
s tates to play in the

It remains an emphasis on the United States

There is, to be sure, a mill tary role for the United

~estern

Pacific .

In any integrated concept of a durable

peace in that region, however , the accent should have long since shifted to
multilateral diplomacy and on how to sustain an expansion of commerce and other
mutually beneficial relationships .

In such a concept, too , I should think that

we would have already moved to try to establish regular diplomatic relations
with the present governments in Viet Nam , Cambodia and taos as a contribution
to stabilizing the situation in Asia .
That course would also be the best way to permit a final resolution
of doubts concerning the still missing in action as a result of the Indochina
war .

It is not a sufficient answer to the question of their fate to proclaim

- 4 over and over again our national concern or to memorialize our sympathy .
is there any real contribution to the peace of mind of the ramilies

o:

ror

the

still missing in demanding with words what cannot be obtained in the absence
of diplomatic contact .

That course, in

my

judgment, borders on making a

political Dockery of human heartaches .
I t is time to get rinal answers on the MIA ' s .

It is time to find out

what can be found out and then to let tl"e dead reut in peace .

It is reprehen -

sible in the extreme to treat the war casualties of this nation as

·~argaining

chips'' of diplomacy or the pawns of politics .
In any design
which led us into
tion as regards

t

~or

,~ 1"\

durable

c\ \C..

the-~isaaventure

'
the people

peac~ ,

1t is also time to drop the approach

in Indochina and into two decades of aliena-

of China.

It is time to discard the assumption that

this nation's power is such as to be able to control the flow of events on the
Asian mainland.

Viet Nam should have made clear that our ability even to

exercise u rational influence on the affairs of that continent is limited.
Underscoring the point are the wasted years and the squandered resources in
dealing with China on the basis of the long-distance hostility of cold war .
The United states is, in my judgment, not an Asian power but a major
Pacific nation .

The difference is more than semantic .

It is the difference

between a sensible acceptance of the realities of Asia and the dangerous
illusions of military omnipotence .

It is the difference between what this

nation can reasonably do for peace and .freedom and the serious damage which
it does to itsel.f when it presumes to do more .
The outer liDits of our unilateral and bilateral

defens ~n

the

Pacific, in my judgment, are the Aleutians , Japan and the Philippines .

Beyond

that , insofar as this nation is concerned, the enhancement of the nation ' s
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is properly sought in developing multilateral relationships of peace

and in atrengthening bilateral relationships with Asian governments, preferably
those strongly rooted in their

o·~

people .

In short, the projections of the

military defense of the Western approaches to the United States should be
confined to the Pacific Ocean .

~e

ought not, as we have done, presume to extend

them on to the Asian mainland.
Nor, in the name of defense, should we pursue a course which leads
us militarily into a third ocean, the Indian Ocean, and its adjacent l ands .
The first step in that direction, I regret to say, has been taken by the backdoor acquisition of Diego Garcia through questionable leasing practices .

The

development of that base is probably the opening gun in a campaign to build an
Indian Ocean

fleP~ .

Nhat for?

Tflhat interests of the people of this nation are

involved that they should be called on to pay for a third -ocean navy?

In truth ,

we have neither the manpower nor the resources to engage in an arms buildup in

the Indian Ocean, without massive increases in Federal expenditures .

If the

Diego Garcia boondoggle materializes, what we will have gained, in my judgment,
is not greater security for this nation but a further weakening of our capacity
to meet the real needs of the American people .

we will have established the

nucleus of another massive burden of taxes and inflation .
One hopeful sign in this situation is that the Senate on its own
responsibility and the House in conference with the Senate, directed that
appropriations for fiscal '76, except for a $250,000 safeguard--on the airfield
at Diego Garcia - -be held off until April 1 .

During that period, the President

has been asked to try to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union which
could preclude both powers from establishing bases in the Indian Ocean .

That

is not much because if we are determined to waste our substance, I expect that

- 6 the Russians are not going to help us to save it.

At least, however, the

measure does permit a brief period to stop, look and listen before we proceed
further al ong this course .
On the other side of the globe, we have in excess of 500,000 military
personnel and dependents in Western Europe, thirty years after the end of the
Second world war .

It is probably the most ro stly single expenditure for a non-

productive purpose in the Federal budget.

This anacronistic deployment is a

relic of vlorld war II and the early years of the Cold \var .

\olhatever relevance

it may have once had to the nation ' s security has all but disappeared.

Even

as an interim measure , the U. S. military deployment in Europe has little
significance in its present form, to the search for a durable peace in Europe .
Much less does it relate to the actual defense of that continent against an
invasion from the East.
and

u. s.

Nevertheless , the drain on

dollars is unabated.

u. s.

military manpower

I can only reiterate what I have said many

times over the past dozen years or more :

The deployment can and should be

cut substantially and unilaterally in line with the interests of the United
States .

It will not weaken our defense , in my judgment; rather, it will

strengthen the nation by lightening the btrrden on the economy .
As of last July, including this European deployment, we had a total of
518,000 military personnel overseas .

In addition, 37, 000

u. s.

citizens and in

the neighborhood of 150, 000 foreign nationals were engaged as civilian employees
in support of these forces.

Finally, 370, 000 dependents of

were overseas to accompany them .

u. s.

tax-payers , for what are termed

Not even mentioned are bargain-basement sales or gifts of

military equipment to other nations also , presumably, for
policy purposes .

servicemen

The total is l , o6o, ooo people, in one form

or another stationed abroad, paid for by
"defense purposes."

u. s .

u. s .

defense or foreign

The subsidized cost of these activities , too , is borne by the

people of the nation .

- 7 If, as the Executive Branch contends , the role of world policeman
for this nation has been rejected, then where is the pattern in this vast
oilitary commitment abroad?

The fact is that there is no pattern.

What this

nation has abroad, supports abroad and promotes abroad, is a composite put together
out of carry-overs of world war II , the Korean war and the Southeast Asian mis adventure .

Add to this motley collection, a host of random undertakings over a

period of several decades often for purposes long since forgotten .

Add to it,

finally, military aid to dozens of countries and vigorous arms merchandising by
the Defense Department in the manner of some latter-day Sir Basil Zaharoff .
Who is trying to sort out this immense, disparate and costly congl omerate?
Where is the effort being made to separate the wheat from the chaff?
wasteful from the necessary?

The

Where are the up -to -date integrated strategic

concepts into which to fit specific

u. s .

defense activities abroad?

to these questions have yet to be supplied .

They must be forthcoming .

The answers
They

are, in my judgment, an absolute requisite both for the restoration of the

u. s.

economy and for an effective

the years ahead .

u. s .

contribution to peace on earhh in

United States
of America
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House of Representatives
The House was not Ill res.ston todt•) Its next meet.mg wlll be held on Monday, December 8, 1975, at 12 o'clock noon.

Senate
FRIDAY, DECEMBER
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1Lrg1slative day oJ TucsdaJI, Dt'cember 2, 197SJ
c11~ccllou

wtt.h government.. sun deeper.

ln the b.w-ock or the nation. are the c1auEerAssurea of eoclal d1Yialo:n.
That Ia hardly a buill on which to buUd a

OU£

HE.!'.~ARKS OF SENATOR .MANSFIELD
BEFORE PACEM IN TERRIS IV
Mr MANSFIELD Mr President. l ask
unanimous consent Utat remarks I made
before Pacem in Terris rl on )csterdny
be prl..nted In the RECORD

There being no objection the remarks

\\ere ordered to be primed In t.he RE

ORD,

follows:
R£).1AtKS OF SENATOR .Mnn: hl;o.N!>l"ll:LD

Foreign Polley Will be nn I.Mue In tho 107C
cnmpalgn. Barring the u1 expected. however,
t~ '11.111 be only an wue, 1 ot tho ISI<Uil Tbe
cunphas1f. In the coming cnmpol n v.•llt be on
allalrs 'llithln the notion ln po.rttc:utar. It
v.lll be on the state ot the nation's (!('()nomy.
NotY.It.tu;tandlng the etrort to talk away our
economic dil'!lcutUes. ther h
} et to be a
rocm cry 1:om lbe worr.t rcc:essl n In tort~
yeara. A\ beSt, v;e bnve rnAnngc<l only to hold
on b)' ftngert1ps; only a Jn!Ul;lnal momentum
bu been generated tor recovtty The tanure
to ta e up to the nation a cconontle problema
1a to be foeC!n ln the r.onll nued bl b unemplO)'llll'Ut. and 1nftatlon J)(!oper collJ5(l(!uences
art \ lstblt 111 a general pul1llc diS(tllltt and

national contrlbuLion w Pacem In TerriJI. so.
I reltt'rl\tc, the prime ll!aue In the coming
otecuon \\Ill be a n1~andertng economy. Un ·
le= v. e put a atop to the present drlft a n<J
bcfln. also, to look Wltb some coordln&ted
!orulght to the looming economic problem
wblcb nre only a few years away, the tnterna·
ttonal role or thiS uatlon !or the next decade
wW be, at moot, an todift'erent one. Indee<l,
u could c en beeome negative. Insofar a
contrlb tit to International peace and 8\1\•
blltty IS con emcd.
Ar. tor tore! •n all Irs, what •s hkely to be
of n1ajor conatderntton ln the next election
Wlll be the drain or out.dated pollclea t.s a
foetor In the deeUne of the economy. Unllltt
earlier y •ra when money Wll6 spent tor ne·
UviLIC!! nbrond ns thou&h tbe nallon had It
W burn, en•ry dollar that now goes 11\l<l
ana~hruul !lc poUcle. and the mllltnry 11truc·
ture to nupport them Ia coming, not out of
an tUihacnt c•·ouomy; It 18 coming out ot the
hldl'a ot thC' pl"ople. H l8 com.l.llg from those
nlllll<lll8 Of Amer!CB\\8 Without taX haVCUh
nnd wHh l\<) Wt\YI'l to hedge the 1n1latlon
OMed forel n pollcil!ll ar~ fl double burdeu on
an already <.>H~riHt~cll.'ned segment of the
populace
ExJlf'lldllt res In th~ name of foreign polk\'
or <tete e even vallrl expendttur<ta, requtrc
t xes 1\od oont.rlbute to the pressure tor In•
tlatton If lillcb Cllpendllurea are In excess or
contemporar)' neect , the}' strain the economv
unnC<'
rlls nod In 1he end do h rm t<.>
the t.ructurc or the n11t1on.
Tn'kto for exnmplt, h~' policy of stllllont
troop In all parts or the globe. \Vltat.:: cr
rehn'llnt'e 11\ICh pollcte~ may have had In tho
!mmedlate JlOAt•Worh.t War II period, It docs
not follow thnt tlles are still relevant tllret
decodes Inter Nor does It mean that the nation'& d f('ll c Will collapse U v.-e alter thesc.deplo u t'l lS, ec lc tbcm down or even In
some en
ut them out entirely. Our hair·
a-million ooldlens v.«".rc returned !rom Vtat
Nam Wl~hout endnngerlng the national 1!1'·
curtty lb.,re are other areas Where t!lmllar
adJunm nt.s, tar tess dnwrt!c to be sure, ~m
to me to btt l'ntlrely pos$1ble and very cit·
alrablc
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

The wor d cha.nges We hA e 1.0 olumge ln atrengt.hentn bUateml re a.Uollllhtpa wtLh
nut tho whcelt of o\-ernment, n!· A.5lan go\'e.'"lllnl:!llt.a. pmerabiJ thoao strongly
urettAbly, t nd to remain tn ru~
pcelallr root«! 1c thctr own ~p n Jn abort, the protn n ~Ud to natlonnl security arrall'll The Jec~ons of t.he military dt'1~ o! the WcstJesson o: Vte• Nnm, for rutnmple, h11.11 yet to c:·n approaches to the United Statea llhould
be Jean:Nt E rn now an rttort 15 be.lns m de
bo con:ftned to the Pacttll:: Ocenu We ought
to M!llntaln n mtlltary poslt.lon on thr Southnot a.s wt- b<we doni! pre ume to extend them
east A111An malnlnnd The :CXe uua Branch on to tbe As1l\n mntnl nd
bescll<'he!i tho Tbnt sovernment to p nnlt us
Nor. 1n tbe name ot dct nao, Gbould '1\'C
t.<> tet-p ~~~ lca.st n shadow at our former pursue a courso 110bt 1 1 d
WI rntlltarUy
prcaencc In that nation WhRt ror A toohold Into a third ocean, tho Jncllan Occlln. lllld
ln Thill lAnd v. Ill cost the Dillion mlllloDA of
Its adJncent hm<b l'be ftrat atep In U1at
dollnra tbat much Is clel\1' But Into v.hat dlrccUon, I ret,-rc to ~my, ha.a been taken by
grand tie tgn tor nauon3.1 securtt.y IUld JH!llCO !.he ba.cl:door acqut.e t1 n of Die o Gnrcta
do """ fit n fov. thou :u d Amert liD
rvtce- through qu Uont>blo 1
ng prnctl
The
men and a aoatterlng or moth•ballcd mUI· de elopment ot t.'lat b
15 probably the
tary bues In Thalland? Stmlluly, there ts opening gun In n cNnpa gn to build an
crcnt ~lu tnnc:e In the go\" rnmen~ to recog· Indl&n Ocean lie t What tor "'bat Interest~~
niUI ~hat o~c.-r " JH!rlo<l or tmc, there has o~ the people o! thl5 uat on CU'I.' Involved th.llt
to be a reduction ot U.S for~ tn Ko~a tbey should be called on to pay ror n third·
and In JapAn
ocean na ')'? In unth, ,.,.., bcu nelt.her tho
'rhe emphnsts or poll y In Mta In sbarL, manpower- na~ the r~urct>& to cnga£c ln an
1!1 M It hM been tor the pMt qunrter or a
arms bu11dup 1n the Indtnn 0<-.ean, wtthout
century or more. It ~malna nn ernphMlll on ma.sst'l'e tncl't!ll.608 In Fedeml cxpendlturos If
tht' Unlt('d Slates M n 'military defcnctor" the Diego Oarcl \ bocmdo glo 1no.ter1nllze.:s,
Th<>ro 1!1, 1~ bn suro, n mllltl\rv role for the wbnt v.e ''111 hnvc plnod, In my Judgmeut,
Unl,~d Str1tcs to piCIY In the \\ o• torn I'MIOc.
Is no~ gretttcr scuurlt) Jor Wda nn.tton but a
In BIIY llll<!J!rntccl conce!)t of 11 ctur1Lbln p< I>C~ further wcal{enlng nr our cnpu.clty t.o mce~
In thnL wglou, howtovor, the necont aJ"'uld tho real need, or tlw Arnertcnu puoplo. \VC>
hl\\'<1 1014; l'hiC!I' llhl!tect lO 11\Uillll\1<'1'111 UlplO·
will have establtllhed tho nucleus or nuoUt<•r
nti'CJ md on hO\\ to &ustnln an t'Xptlnl!lon massive burden ot tuca IUid lnftatton
or ce>mmerce nnd othe,or umtunlly ber eii<-11LI
One hopeful ISJgn In thb situation Is LhM
relntlollllhlps In st~ch n conccpL, Lo<>, I should the Senate on 1~ own I'C5ponslblllty nnd the
think thnt we v.·ould bnve ntre:ody rooted House lu cou!erenc:o v; ltb t.he ~nate. ctlrected
to tr:r to e tnblbb rcguliU' diplomatic rr.lll· tha~ appropri.Cltlons for t\sc:ul '70, except torn
tJons ..-!th the pnoset.t so~ernmllnU In VUlt 6250.000 sa!eguard <IU tho lrlleld at Diego
Nnm. Cl\mbodtll and I.a011 M n contribution Oa.rclll-bc beld o!J until AprU 1 Durtnc thnt
to &tllbUll.ln the rJt tntlon In As
period !.he ~dent hl\11 troen aake>d to try
'J'hnt COllrRC ,.;ould IIL'IO bo tho ~· WAJ to negotlnte a ~ttlt!ment wtQJ the So~let
to &>t"cnnlt n ftnnl resolution or doubUt con- UniOn v.hlch ooUICI pr<'eludo both powers
C('l'nlng Lho still mts.<;tr. In aeuon liS a r \lit from cst.J.bliShJng basea In tho IndiAn Oc:en.n
or the tnrlochlnn ,.;nr It l~ not n aumd nt That h not much because lf we 11re detertuuv.er to the q~t on ot Lhclr raLo to pro- mined to waste our su~tanr , J e~:poct that
rlalm over tul<l o•er n aln our nnUonal eon- th<- Ru..o;stans n.re 1 o~ otn to help us 1.0
cr.m or to m<'mornll e our aympnth~ Nt,r M\'e It At le:~St howover, the meiiSurc does
Is there lUI) renl conulbuUon to tbe pence pennlt a brter period to sLop, look And Iuten
of n1lnd or the rnmllles or the attn mls! lng ~ro.re we proceed turtlttr along thl& course
In dcm ndlng wtth wo.rd.s what C:linnot b
Ou the other Eld of the globe wo hll\e Jn
obtAined 1 tbe nhscnce or dlpl m tic con- exoe.>S of 500 000 mllt U'} .P raotmel and det ,.~,. 11 1
,..... l
m
Juclgm~ut
rdt'nt
pendent$ ln \'
1 1'
JX
lrty flr.U'IS nt•
on DULkln a po u I mock ry of h
e end o
ond \\ Tid W r It Is
hr.Artach
probab. the m
expenditure
lt ~
me 1.0 get
n tho t
o. nonprodu
In the Federal
MIA
It
ttme to find o 1t vol nt c:an b
b <1.311- '!b
a cro 1 c dl'pl ymt'Dt Is o.
round out and the 1 to let the d nd res In r 1 o~ World War 11 and e e:u"ly years or
pel\ce lL
reprehcn tblc I Lh
xtr me tu tbe Cold Ww- Wha
r relovMte It may
U'ent the wnr cA..,uniUe or this nntton M
hn\"e once had to t1 e u tton • aecurtty has
"barn:• In In chips" or dlplomtcy r th J>aWtUI all but ll!s:tp~nred Even cu: nn lnwnm mea·
of pclltl
sure. the U.S mlllUU')' deploymout In Europe
ln llllf d~lgn ror durnhlc 1 cnce, It Ia nlao lliLS little slglllfleanc:e ln 11..8 presern torm. to
time Lo drop the nppronch whiCh 11;1<1 llll Into tho search for n durniJ!c. porUJe tn buropc.
thl'\ tmctc ml ad\'fllllurc In Indochina nnd Much leas dot•a ll rch~lo to 11w notual doreusl'
lnt<l two de<'tldcs of nllonntlon liS ,.,.~lud tho r r thM conunont agnln t 1111 Invasion tram
JI"Ople ot Chinn It Is tlmll lQ dbcard tbe 1ho F.aat. Ne' erUlelOS. W1o clrntn on u.S rn!ll·
M'<lllllJ)UOll that thiN llRUon's llQWCr 1.< &Ueh
lary manpov.er nnd US dOIIIU'I Ill unaiH>ted.
ns to be nblc to control 1he uow or twcnt3 1 CILil only rt!l~r&te Wh t I hllVC IUI.Id mnny
on tt1e 1\!!lan 'lflalnlanu VIet Nam hould times o;e~ the past d
n yelll'll or m rc 'I he
hn c mado t"lr.nr th t our bl It) en en lo deployment can nnd at 1 d bO c 1t tmbsc.n·
cxcrt'!lSC! a rational 1nnuence on th naatra or
Ially and unUM NLII t.n lb o lth Ulo Interth t cot t1 ut Is llmt~d Undc.r
n tho ~ of tbe United S
H 110UI not we:Llten
point IU'() tbe Y."Mtcd ~ra and the sqUAn- our dl!f~. ln my JUdgm 1 L. rAther, It will
dered re m
In dealln wtU1 Cb ll\ on the
t.rcngtheu e na on by U htc.ntng the burbA!
of the I
-c1 otanc:c h05tl It of cold den n tho N'O!Wm
As of Ia.! July In ludln
EuropeAn
cteplO)-menL, wo ba4 a total o1 JB 000 milltar peroonn I o.e.f60G.S In lldCIItlon, 37,000
US. cttlzens and In th n I hborbOOd of
160.000 1orolgu natlonAle v. ere enga ed a.s
olvlltlUl employco8 1D aupjlOrt or these torccs.
Pinallf, 370 000 C1cpelldentll of U.S.
rvlcem 11 wore o~t'rseaa to ~>~: ompany them. The
tow ts 1.060.000 people ln n rorm or linother stationed abro d. paid tor by U.S taxparens. !or what lli'O tormect "defense purposes.' Not e.-en men to cd are bargatnbMement l53les or
Ut or m lt.\ry cqulpment
to other naU0115 abO pre UJnAbly tor U.S.
d tense or fore n po y p .posu The subs <llzed C<J5t or Ule5e 11e lvlU too, 1a bon1e
by t.he people or tho nuton.
l!, as the Executhe llmnch contend.s. tbo
v. t~b 1
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rolo or v.orld policeman tor thla nation haa
!Jftn reJected, thl'n whe<:e t.s the patwn tn
tht.s •11.'1~ mlllta.ry commJanl'nt abroad? The
tact t. that there I.e no pattern. What thlll
nAUon hll.ll abroad. IUppons·abroad and pro·
mote. abro:ut , Ia " composite put together
out ot carry-o.em of World Wa.r II , tile
Korean WAr 1\Ud the Southeast !>51Rn mtsadv nture Add to thl.s motley collection 11
host or random Ulldert.altlngs over n perlot1
of u~ ern I dccadt>s oiiAln !or purpoo.es lont•
since forgotten Add to It, l'lnaUy. rniiiUU")'
aid to dozens or counLrtes lllld vigorous nmts
mcrctuwdiAing by the Deft'nse Depa.rtmrn~
Ln ;he nlAm er ot some latter-day Sir Baal!
Znharolt Who Is trying to sort out thla lm•
mensc, dlap1\l'lltC and costly conglomemte?
Where Is Ute cttort belng made to Sl'p:lmtA:
the \\·hca~ rrom the CbaJ!? Tbe wnatotul
rrnm the n~CMAr)'? Where are the up-to·
date tntegrati.'CI atnLtt'gtc concepts Into whl~h
to nt epcclnt: U.S. defense actlviUes abrot\d?
'I11t~ answcr11 to lhe.-e queatlon.s htwe yet to
b« aupt>lll'd 'Illt'y mus~ be torth('omlng Th"Y
tLre. In my )ndgmen~. an absolute requl&lt••
both lor the rc·JJtora~lon or the US economy
nnd for nn ciYrotlvo U.S. contribution tn pt'ILCC
on ~:1rU1 111 ~he yenra &!lend.

